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Real Effects of Information Frictions:  
When the States and the Kingdom Became United†
By Claudia Steinwender*
This paper exploits a unique historical experiment to estimate how 
information frictions distort international trade: the establishment of 
the transatlantic telegraph in 1866. I use newly collected data on cot-
ton prices, trade, and information flows from historical newspapers 
and find that the average and volatility of the transatlantic price dif-
ference fell after the telegraph, while average trade flows increased 
and became more volatile. Using a trade model in which exporters 
use the latest news about a foreign market to forecast expected prices, 
I estimate the efficiency gains of the telegraph to be equivalent to 8 
percent of export value. (JEL D83, F12, F14, L96, N71, N73)
Understanding the nature of the frictions that inhibit arbitrage across international 
goods markets and limit market integration is one of the central research objec-
tives in international trade. Summarizing the literature, Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004) and Head and Mayer (2013) observe that direct barriers to goods trade (e.g., 
transport costs and trade tariffs) have been found to be of minor importance, while 
more indirect barriers to trade and market integration (e.g., information frictions) 
have the potential to be of major importance, but are not yet well understood.
This paper focuses on information frictions as a potential explanation for “miss-
ing trade” (Trefler 1995) and low market integration (as measured by deviations 
from the law of one price (LOP), e.g., Rogoff, Froot, and Kim 2001) in goods trade. 
Information is essential for the efficient functioning of markets, but in reality is 
often limited or costly (Jensen 2007; Stigler 1961). For example, exporting firms 
have to spend considerable time and money to learn about preferences of consumers 
in foreign countries and often fail (Albornoz et al. 2012), especially if preferences 
change over time and production and export decisions must be made in advance 
(Hummels and Schaur 2010; Evans and Harrigan 2005; Collard-Wexler 2013). The 
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distortions from information frictions are hard to measure, as information flows are 
usually unobserved and also notoriously responsive to the trading environment.
I use an historical experiment to circumvent these empirical pitfalls: the con-
struction of the transatlantic telegraph connection in the nineteenth century, a large, 
exogenous reduction in information frictions. Before July 28, 1866, mail steam-
ships took between 7 and 15 days to transmit information between the United States 
and Great Britain. The transatlantic cable reduced this information delay to a single 
day. The timing of the connection was exogenous and not anticipated, because ten 
years of technological setbacks obscured whether this new technology could ever 
succeed. This paper is, to my knowledge, the first in the trade literature to observe 
actual information flows, which are based on news about foreign prices reported in 
contemporary newspapers.1 The information flows are used to measure the impact 
of information on prices and exports, and to derive microfoundations for exporters’ 
behavior under information frictions.
This paper focuses on cotton, the most important traded good between Great 
Britain and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. The dominance of 
“King Cotton” provides a unique setting in which to study information frictions, 
because newspapers published detailed and meticulous market reports on cotton. 
No other prices and exports were reported daily. Surprisingly, these rich data have 
never been systematically digitized. I use market reports from newspapers on both 
sides of the Atlantic to construct a daily dataset that includes cotton prices in New 
York and Liverpool, export flows and freight costs between the two ports, and 
detailed information flows for the period from one year before until one year after 
the telegraph connection. The use of this dataset has several advantages. First, using 
export as well as price data makes it possible to determine whether information has 
a real effect on trade, as opposed to only distributing profits across agents. Second, 
it makes it possible to study the impact of information frictions on a durable good. 
Jensen (2007) provides evidence that information reduces spoilage of fish, a highly 
perishable good, but it is not clear whether the same is true for a storable commod-
ity. Third, shipping time makes imports predetermined, which allows me to identify 
the supply and demand functions required for the estimation of the efficiency gains 
brought by the telegraph.
Using these detailed data, I am able to document six reduced-form 
findings (described in the subsections of Section III): (A) The telegraph caused 
increased goods market integration, as the mean and volatility of the cross-Atlantic 
contemporaneous price differences fell. (B) Within the  pre-telegraph period, faster 
steam-ships had a similar effect and increased market integration, whereas during 
the post-telegraph period, temporary technical failures of the transatlantic telegraph 
connection reduced market integration. (C) New York prices responded strongly 
to news from Liverpool, while Liverpool prices reacted less strongly to news from 
New York. (D) The telegraph reduced the mean and volatility of the difference 
between the current price in New York and the latest known price in Liverpool. This 
1 Previous papers using exogenous variation in information frictions used the presence of mobile phone cover-
age (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010), internet kiosks (Goyal 2010), or even the transatlantic telegraph connection (Ejrnæs 
and Persson 2010), but none of these papers observed information flows directly. Observing information (“news”) 
and relating it to prices is much more common in the finance literature (for example, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 
1989; Koudijs 2015, 2016). 
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last finding is a new contribution to the literature on the impact of the telegraph and 
information frictions on financial markets (e.g., Garbade and Silber 1978; Hoag 
2006) and shows that market participants did not naïvely arbitrage away the price 
difference between the current price in New York and their latest known Liverpool 
price, but instead took into account how outdated this information was when form-
ing expectations about future prices. (E) Information frictions had real effects on 
trade flows and were not just a reallocation of profits across market participants, 
because exports responded to news about Liverpool prices. To my knowledge, this 
paper provides the first evidence that the telegraph had real effects on exports. (F) 
After the telegraph, exports were on average both higher and more volatile.
To establish a causal relationship between these findings and the telegraph, I use 
three complementary strategies. First, I show that the findings are robust to a num-
ber of alternative explanations (e.g., transport cost variations, supply irregularities 
in the aftermath of the American Civil War, fluctuations within commodity points 
in no-trade periods, change in the market structure of merchants, futures trading, 
and anticipation effects). Second, to rule out any confounding trends, I use another 
source of exogenous variation in information flows before the telegraph: the irregu-
lar passage times of steam-ships across the Atlantic, which were driven by weather 
conditions. Third, I link prices and exports to information flows and show that out-
comes respond to actual rather than counterfactual information, providing direct 
evidence of the underlying mechanism.
I present a partial equilibrium model of trade under information frictions that 
provides a microfoundation for the empirical findings and can be used to measure 
the efficiency gain of reducing information frictions. In the model, as in nineteenth 
century trade, intermediaries act as arbitrageurs across geographic markets. They 
buy cotton from suppliers at a centralized exchange in New York and ship it to 
Liverpool, where they sell it to cotton millers, again at a centralized market place. 
Aggregate demand from cotton millers follows a stochastic, autocorrelated process. 
Shipping takes time, so merchants have to make their export decision before they 
know the realization of the demand shock, and will base it on the prices they expect 
to generate in Liverpool. Frictions affect the information available to merchants 
when they construct these conditional expectations: if frictions are low, current 
market conditions in Liverpool are considered. If frictions are high, lagged infor-
mation about Liverpool market conditions must be used to predict future selling 
prices. In this model, merchants maximize expected profits, conditional on their 
information set.2
In the model I study the implications of storability for the operation of markets 
with information frictions. Storage moderates the impact of information frictions 
but it cannot eliminate them. The model shows why. For example, consider a posi-
tive demand shock in Liverpool. In this case it is not optimal to release enough stock 
to fully eliminate the effect of the demand shock, because prices in Liverpool need 
to increase to incentivize additional exports to replenish stock for the next period. 
But if prices in Liverpool go up, it is not optimal to release the stock from storage 
in the current period. In equilibrium it is optimal to distribute the effect of a demand 
2 This is different from Allen (2014), who models information frictions as a costly search across markets, and 
merchants optimally decide on how much information to acquire. 
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shock over time by gradually increasing exports, so replenishment of stock takes 
longer than shipping time.
I calibrate the model to match the historical data before the telegraph was intro-
duced. Then I conduct a counterfactual analysis by decreasing information frictions 
to simulate the effect of the telegraph. The resulting predictions are consistent with 
the reduced-form evidence: the volatility of trade flows increases after the tele-
graph connection, because exports follow expected demand shocks in Liverpool. 
With better information, expected demand shocks become more volatile. To see 
this, consider two extremes: without any information, expected demand is equal to 
a constant, the unconditional mean, which has zero variance. With perfect foresight, 
expected demand is actual demand and has the variance of the demand shock. In 
between, more information increases the variance of expected demand, as expected 
demand follows actual demand more closely.
Average exports are lower before the telegraph connection, because periods of 
high demand are systematically underestimated with information frictions. This 
asymmetry arises from restricting exports to be nonnegative: while periods of low 
demand are also systematically overestimated with information frictions, in these 
periods it is never profitable to export. As a result, average exports increase after 
the telegraph, because in periods of high demand exports are higher. The distorted 
export flows are reflected in the difference in prices across the Atlantic: after the tele-
graph, the average and the volatility of the cross-Atlantic price difference decrease.
The model provides an analytical solution for the lower bound of the dead-
weight loss arising from distorted trade flows under information frictions based on 
Harberger Triangles: the deadweight loss from information frictions is a function of 
the squared observed price difference between New York and Liverpool (taking into 
account the shipping lag) as well as the slopes of the demand and supply curves. The 
reduction in the absolute observed price difference after the construction of the tele-
graph connection corresponds to the abolishment of an ad valorem tariff of around 
7 percent. To measure how this translates into efficiency gains, the slopes of the sup-
ply and demand functions need to be estimated. This estimation is usually difficult 
due to the simultaneous determination of quantity and prices, and a valid instrument 
cannot always be found. I propose a novel identification strategy that exploits the 
fact that exports are predetermined once they arrive in Liverpool, since shipping in 
transatlantic cotton trade takes time. This breaks the simultaneity problem under the 
assumption of i.i.d. demand shocks. For the case of autocorrelated demand shocks, I 
split the unobserved demand shock into what is known at the time of exporting and 
demand innovations while the good is being shipped. The former can be controlled 
for using the lagged demand function, while the latter are exogenous to exports.
Combining the estimated parameters with the observed price differences, I esti-
mate the efficiency gain from the telegraph to be 8 percent of the annual export 
value of American cotton. About three-quarters of this gain comes from the reduced 
variance of the cross-Atlantic price difference as cotton is allocated more efficiently 
across days and weeks within a year, while the rest is due to increased average trade.
What are the implications of this paper for today’s modern world, whose opti-
cal glass fiber cables have long since replaced the copper wires of the telegraph? 
The historical example of the transatlantic telegraph provides a microfoundation for 
how exporters (or equivalently, producers) use information about demand shocks to 
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 forecast demand and decide ex ante on export (or production) quantities. Exporters 
and firms still face this problem today, and emerging technologies such as the 
 real-time analysis of “big data” have the potential to help firms forecast demand 
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012). My model can be used to assess the efficiency 
gains in such a setting. The model also illustrates that technologies which reduce the 
time lag between the production decision and consumption, such as faster transport 
and better supply chain management, are complementary to information technolo-
gies that improve the precision of forecasting consumer demand (see also Hummels 
and Schaur 2010, 2013; Evans and Harrigan 2005; Aizenman 2004; Harrigan 2010). 
In fact, firms that successfully manage their supply chain focus on both of these 
dimensions (e.g., Ferdows, Lewis, and Machuca 2004 describes Spanish textile 
manufacturer Zara).
This paper contributes to an emerging literature on information frictions in goods 
trade. On one hand, a number of empirical papers have documented the impact of 
information on market integration. For example, access to mobile phones (Jensen 
2007; Aker 2010; Allen 2014), internet kiosks (Goyal 2010), and internet compari-
son-shopping sites (Brown and Goolsbee 2002) have been found to reduce average 
price dispersion across goods markets. Most closely related to this paper is an earlier 
study by Ejrnæs and Persson (2010) which estimates faster shock transmission after 
the telegraph using weekly wheat prices. However, since their price series exhibits 
a gap of 15 years around the time of the establishment of the telegraph connection, 
it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the telegraph from other confounding trends 
during that period.
On the other hand, an increase in the number of immigrants (interpreted as giv-
ing access to networks, see Rauch and Trindade 2002; Head and Ries 1998; Rauch 
1999, 2001) or web hosts in a country (Freund and Weinhold 2004) and a decrease 
in international telephone call rates (Portes and Rey 2005; Fink, Mattoo and Neagu 
2005) have been found to increase trade. In contrast, I observe actual information 
flows, which allows me to pin down the mechanism by which information affects 
trade. Relating actual information (“news”) to prices is much more common in the 
finance literature (e.g., Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1989; Koudijs 2015, 2016), 
where the transatlantic telegraph has been shown to reduce price dispersion of finan-
cial securities (Garbade and Silber 1978; Hoag 2006). Building on this literature, 
I show that information is important for the real economy and not just financial 
markets: information affects prices in goods markets (which is much less obvious, 
as physical goods need to be shipped across the Atlantic in order to equalize prices) 
and the flow of real physical goods across countries.
The trade literature suggests several mechanisms through which information can 
affect trade. Freund and Weinhold (2004) argue that communication and informa-
tion reduce the fixed cost of market access, while Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2005) 
interpret communication cost as variable trade cost. Alternatively, some authors 
interpret information as reducing search frictions, e.g., sellers are able to sell their 
goods at the market with the highest demand (e.g., Jensen 2007) and buyers find 
the seller with the best offer (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee 2002). Allen (2014) and 
Dasgupta and Mondria (2016) model information cost as search cost and allow 
agents to endogenously determine their information set. These models can rational-
ize the fact that countries import and export the same good at the same time.
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In the current model, there is no search across markets (because there are only 
two countries) nor across buyers and sellers within a country (because there are 
centralized markets in each country). Also, information is exogenously determined 
and not optimally chosen by each agent. Instead, this paper focuses on using exog-
enous information to improve the forecast of a stochastic demand shock. Closest in 
spirit is a recent model by Baley, Veldkamp, and Waugh (2016), which introduces 
uncertainty about endowments in a two-country trade model.
Most of the literature mentioned has focused on the impact of information on 
average price differences and average trade. Instead, this paper points out that the 
variance of both trade and the price difference can be much more strongly affected 
by information frictions than the means. This is important, because the variance of 
the price difference has a direct first-order impact on deadweight losses; ignoring 
this underestimates the efficiency effect of information.
My paper focuses exclusively on the information effects of the telegraph. However, 
there might be other, long-term effects. For example, Lew and Cater (2006) argue 
that the telegraph reduced transport costs by increasing the capacity utilization of 
shipping, which increased trade flows (however, based only on data after 1870). 
Clark and Feenstra (2003) argue that the telegraph enabled international transfer 
of other production technologies. Ellison (1886) claims that the transatlantic cable 
subsequently led to the development of cotton futures trading in the 1870s, because 
cotton could be sold while in transit. These and other additional long-term effects 
would increase the efficiency gains brought about by the telegraph beyond the ones 
estimated in this paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I describes the historical setting, 
Section II describes the collected dataset, and Section III provides reduced-form 
evidence on the effect of the telegraph. Section IV develops a theoretical model of 
information frictions and intermediaries in international trade consistent with the 
empirical findings. Section V estimates the efficiency gains from reducing informa-
tion frictions, and Section VI offers conclusions.
I. Historical Setting
Transatlantic cotton trade was the world’s most important trade linkage in the 
mid-nineteenth century.3 Cotton accounted for more than one-half of US exports 
(Bruchey 1967) and one-third of Great Britain’s imports (The Economist 1866). 
The reasons behind this importance were the superior quality of American cotton 
on one hand and the technological dominance of the British textile industry on the 
other. Virtually all the cotton destined for Great Britain arrived at Liverpool, while 
New York was the major exporting port, responsible for one-third of total US cot-
ton exports (followed by New Orleans and Mobile). British cotton spinners needed 
slightly different equipment to spin American versus other cotton (see also Hanlon 
2015), and therefore could substitute only imperfectly across cotton from different 
countries in the short run (Farnie 1979).
3 In this section I provide a short overview of the historical setting. For more details, please refer to the online 
Appendix. 
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Merchants bought cotton at the New York exchange from cotton farmers (alter-
natively, they could sell it to the domestic cotton-spinning industry), shipped it to 
Liverpool, and sold it at the Liverpool exchange to cotton millers. The merchant 
community was thriving and competitive. When merchants bought their cotton 
at the New York exchange, they had to forecast demand conditions in Liverpool 
upon its arrival. Demand at the Liverpool exchange originated from cotton mill-
ers, whose customers were both domestic and foreign; mainly from Continental 
Europe. Export demand for cotton textiles fluctuated frequently depending on the 
course of wars and peace negotiations on the continent, which could take quick 
and unexpected turns.
Information was therefore important at the cotton exchanges. Each exchange had 
a newsroom, which provided newspapers, circulars, and some telegraphic informa-
tion to individual merchants at no cost (Farnie 2004). Most important for the pur-
poses of this paper, it provided the Reuter’s Telegram, a compilation of news that 
included cotton prices. These cotton prices can therefore be interpreted as public 
information from the point of view of merchants.
Before the transatlantic telegraph connection, commercial information such as 
cotton prices was transmitted using a combination of existing land-based telegraph 
cables and steam-ships. Steam-ships usually took around ten days to cross the 
Atlantic, but depending on weather this could be anything between one and three 
weeks. The transatlantic connection immediately changed communication flows 
dramatically. Communication was now possible with only a one-day delay (mes-
sages from Great Britain to New York still had to be retransmitted at each of several 
intermediate posts (Lew and Cater 2006)). Occasional technical breakdowns were 
usually repaired within a couple of days.
The timing of the successful telegraph connection was unforeseen and exoge-
nous to economic conditions, characterized by a series of failures and setbacks. It 
took five attempts over the course of almost ten years until a lasting connection was 
established. The first attempt in 1857 resulted in a snapped cable, whose ends were 
lost in the deep sea. The second attempt in 1858 produced a working connection, but 
too slow for commercial purposes, and the connection lasted only three weeks. The 
media even began to suspect that the working connection had been a “hoax” alto-
gether. The Boston Courier asked: “Was the Atlantic Cable a Humbug?” The fourth 
attempt in 1865 also ended in a broken cable. By 1866 there was little confidence 
left, but even if the public had expected this fifth attempt to work, the precise timing 
could not have been foreseen, as weather conditions determined the progress of the 
cable-laying steam-ship.
Nonetheless, to universal surprise and excitement, on July 28, 1866 the first 
telegraph message, a congratulatory message from the Queen of England to 
the President of the United States, was transmitted. Among the next messages 
were already the most important commercial news, which included cotton 
price quotations. From then on, the telegraph worked surprisingly quickly and 
reliably.
Once completed, the transatlantic telegraph raised high hopes among contempo-
rary press: “The Atlantic Cable will tend to equalize prices and will eliminate from 
the transactions in bonds, in merchandise and in commodities, an element of uncer-
tainty which has had the effect of […] seriously damaging the commercial relations 
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between this country and Europe.”4 This paper uses empirical and theoretical evi-
dence to assess whether this prediction came true.
II. Data Description
To establish a causal relationship between delayed information, market inte-
gration, and trade flows, data requirements are substantial. First, I need wholesale 
price and export data on an identical good from at least two different marketplaces. 
Second, these prices and export flows should be reported daily to correspond to 
the actual adjustment horizon of prices to information in the real world (Ejrnæs, 
Persson, and Rich 2008). I can then relate price changes to news arriving that same 
day. Third, I need data on information flows across the Atlantic.
The importance of cotton in the mid-nineteenth century allowed me to locate 
newspapers at the most important ports on either side of the Atlantic (the New 
York Times and the Liverpool Mercury) that provided detailed, daily information 
on cotton markets and trade flows. Furthermore, these newspapers also reported 
news about foreign cotton prices, which makes it possible to reconstruct information 
flows. In fact, the richness of cotton data is extraordinary; no other good is consis-
tently reported with such high frequency in two different countries for the same 
variety around 1866.5 Importantly, prices are reported for the same quality of cotton: 
“middling American,” where middling indicates a specific quality of American cot-
ton (out of seven different, narrowly defined quality categories). The New York and 
Liverpool exchanges used the same quality classification scheme, ensuring that the 
qualities are comparable.
The resulting dataset combines four types of data: market information about 
the Liverpool exchange, market information about the New York exchange, trade 
flows between New York and Liverpool, and information flows from New York to 
Liverpool (and vice versa).6 The New York Times also reported a weekly and later 
biweekly estimate of the stock of cotton in the warehouses, as well as the daily 
“cotton receipts,” i.e., the cotton that arrived at the exchange from the hinterland and 
Southern ports on any given day. I convert the prices at the New York exchange from 
US dollars to pounds sterling using daily exchange rates from the historical time 
series provided by Global Financial Data. Note that exchange rate fluctuations were 
very small compared to price fluctuations, and do not drive the results. A figure of 
the resulting time series of prices is provided in the online Appendix. The New York 
Times also had a separate “Freights” section, which reported daily the bales of cot-
ton that were shipped to Liverpool, as well as the freight cost paid for that shipment.
I can reconstruct the data on information flows, as both newspapers reported the 
latest mail ship and telegraph arrivals on any given day and its commercial informa-
tion. The newspapers also reported the origination date of these business indicators 
in the other market and the arrival date of the information. The difference in these 
4 New York Evening Post, July 30, 1866, as cited in Garbade and Silber (1978, p. 827). 
5 Ejrnæs, Persson, and Rich (2008) document a general price convergence in weekly wheat prices over the 
course of the nineteenth century, but do not attribute it to specific sources such as the transatlantic telegraph. Since 
wheat trade stops for several years around the time of the telegraph, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship 
between the telegraph and market integration using wheat prices. 
6 More detailed information about the data collection is provided in the online Appendix. 
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dates yields the information transmission time across the Atlantic for any given day, 
which I call “information delay  l ” (see online Appendix for a figure).
My final database comprises 604 observations, one for every work day between 
July 29, 1865 and July 27, 1867. The American Civil War between April 1861 and 
April 1865 severely disrupted cotton exports from the United States, restricting the 
period of analysis. Before the Civil War, newspapers did not report daily cotton 
prices. While it is possible to extend the period of analysis to years after 1867, I kept 
symmetry between the before- and after-telegraph periods.
III. Reduced-Form Findings
As stated above, the telegraph changed information frictions suddenly and dra-
matically. Figure 1 shows the distribution of information lags before and after the 
telegraph. Table 1 provides summary statistics and confirms that the drop in average 
information transmission speed after the establishment of the telegraph connection 
was statistically significant.
How did this drop in information frictions affect the integration of the Liverpool 
and New York cotton markets? In this section I develop six reduced-form findings 
that describe what happened to cotton prices and trade. These findings summarize 
the three complementary strategies I use to establish a causal effect of the tele-
graph. First, I perform a number of robustness checks on before/after telegraph 
comparisons. Second, to rule out any confounding trends, I use another source of 
exogenous variation in information flows within the period before the telegraph was 
established, i.e., the irregular passage times of steam-ships across the Atlantic driven 
by weather conditions. Third, I link prices and exports directly to information flows 
Figure 1. Distribution of Information Lags between New York and Liverpool
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and show that outcomes respond to actual rather than counterfactual information, 
providing direct evidence on the underlying information mechanism.
A. The Telegraph Caused Increased Goods Market Integration, as the Mean and 
Volatility of the Contemporaneous Price Differences Fell
The degree of market integration is usually measured by the contemporaneous 
price difference between two markets (following the literature on the LOP, e.g., 
Dybvig and Ross 1987; Froot and Rogoff 1995, and the literature on the impact 
of information frictions on financial markets, e.g., Garbade and Silber 1978). This 
price difference captures any barrier to price arbitrage across markets (conditional 
on positive trade flows), such as transport and other transaction costs, including 
information frictions. If the telegraph reduced information frictions, we should 
expect to see a decrease in the contemporaneous price difference.
Figure 2 plots the contemporaneous difference between Liverpool and New York 
cotton prices,  p t LIV −  p t NY . The vertical line indicates July 28, 1866, the date when the 
telegraph connection was established. The change in the behavior of the price dif-
ference thereafter is striking: the volatility of the price difference falls sharply, and 
there are fewer very large or very small values. The average price difference falls 
as well. Table 1 shows that the average price difference was 2.56 pence/pound in 
the pre-telegraph period (16 percent of the New York price) and fell to 1.65 pence/
pound. This reduction is statistically significant and corresponds to a fall of 35 per-
cent. The variance of the price difference falls by even more, by 93 percent.7
Are these drops causally related to the transatlantic telegraph? The troublesome 
history of that connection is in favor of this interpretation: the timing of its success 
was driven by technical “luck” and the weather affecting the advancement of the 
cable-laying steam-ship and its ability to locate and repair breaks. The date of the 
7 The variance of the price difference normalized by the respective means falls by a similar percentage. A cor-
responding figure with log prices is provided in the online Appendix and is very similar. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Before telegraph After telegraph Difference
Information lag  l t 10.03 1.31 −8.72(0.13) (0.06) (0.15)
Liverpool price,  p t LIV 18.11 13.16 −4.95(0.33) (0.15) (0.36)
New York price,  p t NY 15.55 11.51 −4.04(0.21) (0.13) (0.25)
Price difference,  p t LIV −  p t NY 2.56 1.65 −0.91(0.18) (0.05) (0.19)
Exports 459.88 631.80 171.90
(37.64) (61.80) (72.37)
Notes: Information lag  l t measures how many days it takes to communicate between Liverpool 
and New York. Prices are in pence per pound of cotton (using the daily exchange rate as 
described in the text and the online Appendix). The price difference is the difference between 
the price in Liverpool and in New York on the same day. Exports from New York to Liverpool 
are given in bales. Newey-West standard errors (lag = 2) in parentheses.
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connection could not have been deliberately timed by market participants to coin-
cide with other market events or developments, and anticipation effects can also 
safely be excluded. However, due to the detailed nature of my data, I can go even 
further and control for alternative explanations in Table 2. Column 1 shows the base-
line drop in the contemporaneous price difference after the telegraph.
Column 2 makes several adjustments. First, I subtract daily freight cost and other 
transport costs from the dependent variable. Detailed daily transport costs are rarely 
available in empirical papers, but I was able to obtain daily freight cost of cotton for 
shipment from New York to Liverpool from the New York Times, and all other trans-
port cost components (e.g., bagging, marking, wharfage, cartage, dock dues, weigh-
ing, storage at the port, fire and marine insurance, Liverpool town dues, brokerage) 
from contemporary bookkeeping figures of merchants (more details are provided in 
the online Appendix; Figure 2 plots the freight rates and total transport cost).8
Second, price differences reflect the barriers to arbitrage only when there is trade 
between the two markets.9 I therefore reduce the sample to exclude a period of 
about four weeks during May 1866 (before the telegraph), when the threat of a war 
between Austria and Prussia depressed demand for cotton in Liverpool and lowered 
prices so much that exporting became unprofitable.
Third, I control for disruptions in cotton trade that were caused by the American 
Civil War, which ended just three months before my sample period. Cotton produc-
tion fell by three-quarters (from four to one million bales) during the Civil War, and 
8 Note that 83.1 percent of transport costs are charged based on weight. This large share of unit transport cost 
is also why my preferred specification to test the LOP is in levels rather than logs; the log transformation would be 
helpful only with ad valorem transport costs. Nonetheless, the results are robust to using log prices; the regression 
results in log prices are provided in the online Appendix. 
9 During no-trade periods, the price difference fluctuates freely between the bounds given by the transport 
costs (called commodity points):  − τ t <  p t LIV −  p t NY <  τ t and is not informative about trade barriers. Notice that 
regression results using the absolute price difference  | p t LIV −  p t NY | −  τ t as a dependent variable are very similar. 
However, since there are no exports from Liverpool to New York during the whole sample period, this is not the 
correct relationship to test. 
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did not again reach prewar levels until 1870 (see the online Appendix for a figure). 
During both harvest years immediately after the Civil War, from which the data in 
my sample covering the time around the telegraph are taken, cotton production was 
around one-half of prewar levels. It is reassuring that total annual cotton production 
is similar in those two years. However, it is possible that cotton supply is still dis-
rupted during the first year of my data, which is also the first year after the Civil War. 
If there are no barriers to arbitrage, a larger volatility of production affects only price 
levels and not price difference, as shocks are transmitted to the other country. To 
account for the possibility that there were some barriers to arbitrage, and to inves-
tigate whether supply irregularities therefore had an effect on the price difference, 
I use data on cotton receipts, which measure the supply of cotton at the New York 
exchange from farms on any given day, and control for the one-day lagged cotton 
supply in the regression.10
Column 2 in Table 2 makes all these adjustments, but the results are basically 
unchanged.11
While the contemporaneous price difference is a widely used and useful proxy 
to measure market integration, it takes time to ship goods across the Atlantic, and 
merchants should have used the price in Liverpool at the time of the arrival of the 
shipment of their cargo  p t+k LIV as basis for arbitrage (or rather, their expectation of 
10 One-day lagged rather than contemporaneous cotton supply is used because handling and turn-around of 
cotton takes a day. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. More details are provided in the online 
Appendix. 
11 In the online Appendix, I provide regression results which implement each of the mentioned adjustments at 
a time. 
Table 2—Effect of Telegraph on Average and Variance of Contemporaneous Cotton Price 
Difference between Liverpool and New York
 p t LIV −  p t NY  p t LIV −  p t NY −  τ t  p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t 
 ˆ  var of
 p t LIV −  p t NY 
 ˆ  var of
 p t LIV −  p t NY −  τ t 
  ˆ  var of
 p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.56 1.45 1.34 3.36 2.15 3.88
(0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.59) (0.40) (0.77)
Telegraph dummy −0.91 −0.91 −0.87 −3.11 −1.97 −3.80
(0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.59) (0.43) (0.86)
Cotton  supply t−1 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.12(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.13)
Exclude no-trade periods Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 604 575 575 604 575 575
Notes: For more details on specifications and specifications adding one robustness check at a time, see the online 
Appendix. Columns 2 to 3 and 5 to 6 exclude the period of around four weeks during May 1866, when exporters were 
inactive because the price in New York exceeded the price in Liverpool; and subtract transport cost which include 
freight cost and other transport cost. Columns 3 and 6 use the price in Liverpool at the time of the arrival of the ship-
ment to adjust for the transport time of shipment (k is equal to the steamship travel time, which was used to transport 
the samples of cotton bales that could be used for transactions on the exchange). Columns 4 to 6 use an estima-
tor of the variance of the price difference as a dependent variable:  ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N before  ________  N before − 1 ( pdfiff t −  ‾ pdiff before ) 2 
if the observation is before the telegraph, and  ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N after  _______  N after − 1 ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff after ) 2 if the observation is after 
the telegraph. This implies that the coefficient on the constant yields the sample variance on the period before the 
telegraph, and the coefficient on the telegraph dummy yields the change in the sample variance before versus after 
the telegraph. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses (lag = 2).
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that price). In order to see whether the time delay due to shipping confounds the 
 estimation, I use the dependent variable  p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t in column 3 of Table 2, but 
the effect of the telegraph is also visible in this specification.
In columns 4 to 6, I conduct the same robustness checks for the variance in price 
 difference. I use the following estimator of the daily variance of the price difference 
in the dependent variable:  ˆ  var(pdif f t ) ≔   N before  ______  N before − 1 (pdif f t −  ‾ pdiff before ) 
2 if the 
observation is from the year before the telegraph, and  ˆ  var(pdif f t ) 
≔   N after  ______  N after − 1  (pdif f t −  ‾ pdiff after ) 
2 if the observation is from the year after the tele-
graph. Even though this estimator is based on only a single observation (the price 
difference on that day t, in addition to the mean before or after the telegraph), it is an 
unbiased estimator of the variance, which is all that is needed for a consistent regres-
sion coefficient (though it may not be the most efficient method of estimation). I 
regress this squared deviation of the price difference from the mean as a dependent 
variable and regress it on a dummy that indicates the period after the telegraph.12 
The coefficient on the telegraph dummy then corresponds to the change in variance. 
Column 4 shows that the variance of the price difference falls precipitously after the 
telegraph; the drop is around 90 percent. Column 5 shows that excluding no-trade 
periods explains one-third of the drop, but controlling for shipping time adjustments 
in column 6 further increased the effect of the telegraph on the variance of the price 
difference.
Contemporary accounts observe that the transatlantic telegraph contributed to 
the development of futures trading in cotton across the Atlantic, as for the first 
time information traveled faster than goods (Dumbell 1927; Irwin 1954; Ellison 
1886). If the change in the pattern of the price difference is due to the introduction 
of futures trading, it is indirectly caused by the telegraph (rather than directly by 
changing information frictions). However, the development of futures trading was 
not immediate; the “invention” of transatlantic futures trading (including short sell-
ing and hedging) is usually dated to 1868 or 1869 (Woodman 1968) and did not 
take off fully only until organized futures trading at the exchanges was developed in 
the 1870s. Since this is after my sample period, the introduction of futures cannot 
explain my findings.
Finally, it is interesting to explore whether the observed change in the price differ-
ence is the result of a change in markups by merchants, perhaps because of increased 
competition. I used data on individual shipments from the Bills of Trade to compute 
Herfindahl indices for cotton merchants separately for shipments from the United 
States and shipments from Egypt and the East Indies (see the online Appendix). 
The Herfindahl index was very low, around 0.05, suggesting high competition, and 
this did not change after the telegraph, either for merchants to the United States or 
to the East. Therefore it does not seem plausible that a change in markups could be 
responsible for the findings.
12 As an alternative measure, in the online Appendix I normalize the dependent variable by the average price 
difference before and after the telegraph connection (similar to a coefficient of variation). 
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B. Faster Steam-Ships Had an Effect Similar to That of the Telegraph in the  
Pre-Telegraph Period. They Also Increased Market Integration. Similarly,  
in the Post-Telegraph Period, Temporary Technical Failures of the Transatlantic 
Telegraph Connection Reduced Market Integration
The previous analysis compares the variance of the price difference in the year 
after the telegraph to the variance in the previous year based on a one-time change 
in information frictions. However, even before the telegraph connection, the infor-
mation delay was not constant: in the pre-telegraph period, weather and wind accel-
erated or delayed mail steam-ships. Similarly, even after the telegraph cable was in 
place, occasional technical breakdowns stopped communication temporarily. These 
weather-related and technical variations in information lag can be used as additional, 
exogenous “mini-experiments” to test whether the large changes in the variance of 
the price difference hold when using smaller daily shocks to information delays.
This is tested in Table 3. As a starting point, column 1 regresses the daily estimate 
of the variance of the price difference on the telegraph dummy, confirming that after 
the telegraph, the variance of the price difference fell. Column 2 uses instead the 
daily information lag as a regressor, i.e., how old the most recent information from 
the other side of the Atlantic was on a given day in the sample (graphed in the online 
Appendix). The coefficient is positive and significant, confirming that older infor-
mation (i.e., longer information lags) increased the variance in the price difference. 
For each additional day information takes to get from Liverpool to New York, the 
deviation from the LOP increases by 23 percent. Column 3 uses both the telegraph 
dummy and the information lag as regressors and is the most demanding test: the 
positive coefficient in the information lag shows that even within either the pre- and 
post-telegraph years, older information increased the variance of the price difference.
Overall, more recent information leads to the same reduction in the variance of 
the price difference, no matter whether the source of this reduction is the telegraph, 
faster steam-ships bringing information (in the pre-telegraph period), or telegraph 
repairs (in the post-telegraph period).
Table 3—Effect of Daily Information Lag on the Variance in Cotton Price 
Difference
              Dependent variable:  ln  ˆ  var( p t LIV −  p t NY −  τ t ) 
(1) (2) (3)
Telegraph dummy −2.10 −0.78
(0.28) (0.83)
Information lag  l t , work days 0.23 0.15(0.03) (0.09)
ln(cotton supply t−1 ) −0.16 −0.16 −0.16(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 574 574 574
Notes:  ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N before  ________  N before − 1  ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff before ) 2 if the observation is before the telegraph, and 
 ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N after  _______  N after − 1 ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff after ) 2 if the observation is after the telegraph. This implies 
that the coefficient on the constant yields the sample variance on the period before the tele-
graph, and the coefficient on the telegraph dummy yields the change in the sample variance 
before versus after the telegraph. No-trade periods are excluded as in Table 2. Newey-West 
standard errors (lag = 2) in parentheses.
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C. New York Prices Responded Strongly to News from Liverpool, While Liverpool 
Prices Reacted Less Strongly to News from New York
The response of New York to news from Liverpool is best illustrated by the 
example in Figure 2 that explains the large upward spike in the price difference. 
Figure 3 drills down into this period: on September 30, 1865 the market in Liverpool 
experienced increased demand for cotton from spinners and millers. The Liverpool 
Mercury of that day reported that the market was “stimulated by the increasing firm-
ness of the Manchester [yarn] market.” At the same time, a mistake in the estimation 
of cotton stock in Lancashire was detected, leading to a downward correction. As 
a result, the Liverpool cotton price jumped by 12 percent within two days, from 
21.5 to 24 pence/pound. However, due to the delayed information transmission by 
mail ships, market participants in New York were not aware of this demand shock. 
The next steam-ship, arriving in New York on October 2, still carried the outdated 
price information from September 23, a week before the demand shock. Only on 
October 9 did the news of the demand shock arrive, causing a jump in the New York 
cotton price as export demand increased. The New York Times reports an “unusually 
large quantity [of exports] under the favorable advices from England” on that day. 
This example also illustrates that information has real effects on export flows, and 
not just redistribution of profits across market participants.
To study more systematically whether news from Liverpool drove New York 
prices, column 1 in Table 4 starts with a parsimonious specification and regresses the 
New York price on a given day on the latest known price from Liverpool using only 
New YorkNew York, October 9, 1865
• News about higher price arrive in New York
• Price immediately jumps up: “under the favorable advices 
from England” (New York Times, October 10, 1865)
• Exports increase: “unusually large quantity” (New York 
Times, October 12, 1865)
• Increased demand from cotton millers: “stimulated by the 
increasing ﬁrmness of the Manchester market” (Liverpool 
Mercury, September 30, 1865)
Liverpool, September 30,  1865
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Figure 3. Reaction of New York Prices to News from Liverpool
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data from the pre-telegraph period. This latest known Liverpool price was trans-
mitted by steam-ship, taking on average 10 days and is denoted “‘steam-shipped’ 
Liverpool price” in the table. To account for autocorrelation in prices, I implement 
maximum likelihood estimation including three lags of the dependent variable.
The coefficient on this latest known Liverpool price is positive, indicating a sys-
tematic reaction of the New York price to news from Liverpool. Since prices are seri-
ally correlated, it is possible that this coefficient reflects something other than the 
“news” about Liverpool. Therefore, column 2 includes a “counterfactual” price: the 
Liverpool price from the previous day, which was unknown to New Yorkers before 
the telegraph connection. Reassuringly, this unknown price has no impact on New 
York prices, while the coefficient on the steam-shipped price remains the same. 
Columns 3 and 4 perform the corresponding analysis for the period after the tele-
graph was established. The “telegraphed” Liverpool price, on average one day old, 
becomes the major driving force of the New York price, and the outdated price infor-
mation that the steam-ship would previously have brought no longer matters. Note 
that the reaction of the New York price to the most recent Liverpool price is actually 
stronger after the telegraph. This makes sense, and is in line with the model that I 
will present later: merchants react more strongly to more recent information, proba-
bly because they understand that it is a better predictor of future market conditions.13
Liverpool prices also respond to information about prices in New York: in 
Table 5 we can see that the latest news about the New York price influences the 
Liverpool price, rather than a counterfactual telegraphed price or a counterfactual 
steam-shipped price. However, the elasticity of Liverpool prices to information 
about New York is much smaller than the elasticity of New York prices to informa-
tion about Liverpool. This seems puzzling at first: why did Liverpool importers react 
to news much less strongly than New York exporters? Notice however that importers 
in England would always have to send their import orders by mail to New York. By 
13 This parsimonious specification is the most efficient regression to demonstrate the changing relevance of 
Liverpool’s prices on the New York market, as it explicitly uses the timing of information arrivals. As an alternative 
specification I provide in the online Appendix a vector autoregression using both prices separately, before and after 
the telegraph. Before the telegraph, only lags on the Liverpool price longer than 10 days are relevant for the New 
York price. After the telegraph, lags between 1–5 days are most relevant, in line with the distribution of information 
lags in Figure 1. 
Table 4—Impact of Telegraphed versus Steam-Shipped Liverpool Cotton Price  
on New York Cotton Price
Dependent variable: ln(New York price) Before telegraph After telegraph
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(“telegraphed” Liverpool price) 0.002 0.734 0.710
(0.066) (0.061) (0.065)
ln(“steam-shipped” Liverpool price) 0.434 0.434 0.069
(0.032) (0.032) (0.064)
Observations 301 301 303 303
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use only data from the pre-telegraph period; columns 3 and 4 use only data from the post-tele-
graph period. Counterfactual “telegraphed” price before telegraph is the Liverpool price in  t − 1 . Counterfactual 
“steam-shipped” price after telegraph is Liverpool price in  t − 10 . Prices are measured in pence/pound. Estimation 
of an AR(3) model with maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses.
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the time orders arrived in New York, there would be more up-to-date information, 
and importers were wise enough to use this information by having subsidiaries or 
agents in New York, to whom they could give instructions contingent on actual sup-
ply shocks in New York. This explains why the behavior of importers in Liverpool 
does not affect prices much in response to news from New York.
Besides merchants, stock holders in Liverpool could potentially influence the 
Liverpool price in response to news from New York, by selling or holding onto their 
stock. For example, if they heard about a positive supply shock in New York, they 
would expect this supply to arrive in Liverpool in two weeks, depressing prices then. 
So storers would be wise to sell some of their stock now while the price remains 
high, which would be reflected in the Liverpool price responding to news from New 
York. However, in the presence of uncertainty about future demand and supply, it 
was very difficult for storers to determine the optimal day to sell stock. Storers post-
poning buying and selling decisions in the hope of better prices in the future may 
explain the lower elasticity in Liverpool.
D. The Telegraph Reduced the Mean and Volatility of the Difference between the 
Current Price in New York and the Latest Known Price in Liverpool
The results above suggest that market participants reacted to news about Liverpool 
prices. Did market participants in New York try to equalize the difference between 
the current New York price and the latest Liverpool price they actually observed? 
If so, we should not expect to see an effect of the telegraph on the lagged price 
difference,  p t− l t  LIV −  p t NY − τ . In contrast to the previous studies on the effect of the 
telegraph on financial markets, I have the most recent Liverpool price that New 
York merchants observed for any given day in the sample, and can therefore test 
this relationship. Interestingly, even the average lagged price difference is reduced 
after the telegraph, as shown in column 2 of Table 6. Column 4 shows that the drop 
in the variance of the price difference is reduced by two-thirds, but there remains a 
significant effect of the telegraph (see the online Appendix for a graph).
These novel results suggest that merchants did not merely assume that the most 
recently observed price in Liverpool would still hold when their current ship-
ments arrived. Instead, the merchants used the lagged, known price as the basis for 
Table 5—Impact of telegraphed versus Steam-Shipped New York Price  
on Liverpool Price
Dependent variable: ln(Liverpool price) Before telegraph After telegraph
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(“telegraphed” New York price) −0.036 0.088 0.087(0.051) (0.046) (0.047)
ln(“steam-shipped” New York price) 0.082 0.082 0.016
(0.043) (0.043) (0.056)
Observations 301 301 303 303
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use only data from the pre-telegraph period; columns 3 and 4 use only 
data from the post-telegraph period. Counterfactual “telegraphed” price before telegraph is the 
New York price in  t − 1 . Counterfactual “steam-shipped” price after telegraph is New York 
price in  t − 10 . Prices are measured in pence/pound. Estimation of an AR(14) model with 
maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses.
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 predicting the future Liverpool price. Before the telegraph, the lagged Liverpool 
price was more outdated and had to be more heavily discounted when predicting 
the future. The difference between the lagged, known Liverpool price and the cur-
rent New York price (which reflects merchants’ expectations about future Liverpool 
prices) should therefore be less volatile after the telegraph, when information is 
more recent. For this reason the model in my theoretical section will feature ratio-
nal merchants who use their expectations of the selling price in Liverpool as basis 
for arbitrage,  E [ p t+k LIV] −  p t NY − τ . While the last known, lagged Liverpool price  p t−l LIV 
most likely informs the expected price  E [ p t+k LIV] , I abstract from naïve merchants who 
would set them equal to each other.
The observation that even the lagged price difference falls on average after the 
telegraph is consistent with two explanations. First, competition among merchants 
could be fiercer after the telegraph, leading to a reduction in the average markup. 
Second, the telegraph could have reduced uncertainty and risk, which would be 
reflected in a reduction in the risk premium of merchants in trade. Notice that the 
evidence on Herfindahl indices discussed earlier suggests that competition stayed 
constant, which is inconsistent with a change in markups. Instead, there is ample 
evidence in historical articles that risk mattered to merchants, and that the telegraph 
reduced it substantially (e.g., Ellison 1886; Hammond 1897). For this reason I will 
consider an extension of my model with risk-averse merchants in the theory section.
E. Exports Respond to News about Liverpool Prices
The analysis so far has considered only prices as outcomes. But does information 
have real effects? The detailed daily data on export flows can be used to under-
stand whether the observed changes in the price difference are driven by equivalent 
changes in exports.
Table 6—Effect of Telegraph on the Difference between Lagged, Known Liverpool Cotton Price 
and Current New York Cotton Price
  p t LIV −  p t NY −  τ t   p t− l t  LIV −  p t NY −  τ t   ˆ  var of  p t LIV −  p t NY −  τ t   ˆ  var of  p t− l t  LIV −  p t NY −  τ t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.45 1.78 2.15 1.02
(0.16) (0.11) (0.40) (0.14)
Telegraph dummy −0.91 −1.18 −1.97 −0.64
(0.15) (0.10) (0.43) (0.12)
Cotton  supply t−1 0.13 0.10 0.01 −0.06(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
Observations 575 575 575 575
Notes: Transport costs  τ t include freight cost and other transport cost. The sample excludes the no-trade period 
in May 1866. Column 1 repeats column 2 in Table 2. Column 2 uses a different dependent variable,  p  t−l t  LIV − 
p t NY −  τ t ,where  p  t−l t  LIV  is the latest Liverpool price that is known in New York, i.e.,  l t denotes the information lag 
or travel time of information across the Atlantic. The information lag is not constant, but varies by day depend-
ing on actual data. Similarly, column 3 repeats column 5 in Table 2. Column 4 uses  p  t−l t  LIV instead of  p t LIV to create 
the price difference.  ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N before  ________  N before − 1  ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff before ) 2 if the observation is before the telegraph, and 
 ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N after  _______  N after − 1 ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff after ) 2 if the observation is after the telegraph. This implies that the coefficient 
on the constant yields the sample variance on the period before the telegraph, and the coefficient on the telegraph 
dummy yields the change in the sample variance before versus after the telegraph. Newey-West standard errors in 
parentheses (lag = 2).
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Table 7 uses a specification similar to that in Table 4 with exports as outcome 
and tests whether news about Liverpool prices affects exports. Column 1 uses only 
data from the year before the telegraph and shows that news of an increase in the 
Liverpool price leads to increased exports. Again, this news brought by steam-
ship was around 10 days old. Column 2 conducts a placebo test and includes the 
unknown Liverpool price from the previous day, called “telegraphed” price. This 
counterfactual “news” has no significant impact on exports, as we would expect. 
Column 3 adds a linear time trend to control for a potential build-up of supply after 
the American Civil War. Columns 4 to 6 conduct a similar analysis for the period 
after the telegraph. News about the Liverpool market again has a positive effect on 
exports, but the coefficient is not significant due to large standard errors. Column 5 
adds the Liverpool price that market participants would have known had there been 
no telegraph. The news from the steam-ship does not have a positive impact on 
exports, but the results are only suggestive, as standard errors are large. Column 6 
allows for a linear time trend; the results remain unchanged. While the coefficient on 
the known Liverpool price is smaller, equality of the coefficients before and after the 
telegraph cannot be rejected. However, it might be rational for merchants to become 
less “responsive” to prices after the telegraph. Before the telegraph, the informa-
tion about a demand shock was older. With autocorrelated demand shocks, more 
periods with high demand had already passed, leading to a more depleted stock in 
Liverpool. Foreseeing this, it was rational for merchants to export more upon receipt 
of such news before the telegraph, compared to after.
F. After the Telegraph, Exports Are on Average Higher and More Volatile
Column 1 in Table 8 shows that average daily exports from New York to Liverpool 
increased by 37 percent after the telegraph.14 Column 1 in Table 9 shows that the 
variance of exports increased even more, by 114 percent.15
14 0.17/0.46 = 37 percent.
15 0.33/0.29 = 114 percent. A graph of daily exports is provided in the online Appendix. 
Table 7—Impact of Known Liverpool Cotton Price on Exports
Dependent variable: ln(exports) Before telegraph After telegraph
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(“telegraphed” 0.004 0.239 1.497 1.608 2.285
 Liverpool price) (1.015) (1.109) (1.856) (2.352) (2.460)
ln(“steam-shipped” 2.398 2.395 2.601 −0.164 0.827
 Liverpool price) (0.659) (1.046) (1.052) (2.478) (2.449)
Linear time trend Yes Yes
Observations 217 217 217 234 234 234
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 use only data from the pre-telegraph period; columns 4 to 6 use only data from the 
post-telegraph period. Counterfactual “telegraphed” price before telegraph is the Liverpool price in  t − 1 . 
Counterfactual “steam-shipped” price after telegraph is the Liverpool price in  t − 10 . Exports are measured in 
bales; Liverpool price is measured in pence/pound. Estimation of an AR(14) model with maximum likelihood. 
Standard errors in parentheses.
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The remaining columns in Table 8 present robustness checks for average exports 
similar to the ones implemented for the price difference. The increase in average 
exports after the telegraph connection cannot be explained by a fall in freight cost 
(column 2) or total transport costs (column 3). However, since transport cost might 
be endogenous, I report the remaining robustness checks in this table both with and 
without transport cost as controls. Columns 4 and 5 exclude no-trade periods, and 
columns 6 and 7 include the cotton receipts at the New York exchange from the 
fields to control for possibly expanding cotton production after the American Civil 
War.16 Columns 8 and 9 use log of exports as a dependent variable.17 Overall, the 
regressions show a consistent positive effect of the telegraph on trade.
Is it possible that we see increased exports because the telegraph caused cotton 
suppliers to reroute shipments from Southern ports through New York? As a robust-
ness check, I collected data on aggregate world exports from the United States and 
from the second most important port, New Orleans, which were available weekly in 
The Commercial & Financial Chronicle. In the online Appendix I show that the tele-
graph has a positive effect on both world exports from New Orleans and total United 
States world exports, so the findings in Table 8 cannot be explained by rerouting 
shipments.18
16 Alternatively, I run regression specifications as in Table 8 using cotton receipts as a dependent variable. 
Depending on the specification, cotton receipts either fall or do not change after the telegraph, so an increase in 
cotton production cannot explain increased exports. 
17 A full replication of this table with log exports as dependent variable is implemented in the online Appendix. 
18 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. Detailed results and data descriptions are provided 
in the online Appendix. Note that this is consistent with the previous findings which control for rerouting in an 
alternative way by controlling for cotton receipts which include shipments from Southern ports to New York. 
Table 8—Effect of Telegraph on Average Cotton Exports from New York to Liverpool
  exp t   exp t   exp t   exp t   exp t   exp t   exp t ln( exp t ) ln( exp t )(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.46 −0.34 −1.09 0.51 −1.07 0.30 −1.04 9.54 8.38
(0.04) (0.11) (0.21) (0.04) (0.25) (0.06) (0.25) (0.69) (0.67)
Telegraph dummy 0.17 0.33 0.47 0.13 0.47 0.19 0.47 0.20 0.63
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14)
Transport costs  τ t 2.10 1.50 1.49 1.36 1.85(0.30) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.38)
Cotton supply t−1 0.07 0.03(0.02) (0.01)
ln(cotton supply t−1 ) 0.19 0.13(0.05) (0.04)
Transport costs  τ t include
 Freight cost Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Other transport costs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding no-trade periods Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 604 604 604 575 575 575 575 443 443
Notes: Exports  exp t are in thousand bales. Column 2 controls for freight cost, and column 3 controls for additional 
transport cost (for details, see online Appendix). From column 4 on, the period of around four weeks during May 
1866 (when exporters were inactive because the price in New York exceeded the price in Liverpool) is excluded. 
From column 6 on, the one day lagged cotton supply (receipts, in thousand bales) is used to control for potential dis-
ruptions in cotton production after the American Civil War. Newey-West standard errors (lag = 4) in parentheses.
677STEINWENDER: INFORMATION FRICTIONSVOL. 108 NO. 3
Table 9 conducts the same robustness checks for the variance of exports. Again, 
the increase in variance after the successful telegraph connection cannot be explained 
by these alternative hypotheses. To account for the increase in average exports, col-
umns 8 and 9 use the variance of exports divided by average export (which is similar 
to the coefficient of variation) as a dependent variable, but results are unchanged.19
The following section provides an intuitive model of how information influ-
ences the behavior of exporters, yielding predictions consistent with the presented 
reduced-form findings.
IV. Model of Information Frictions in International Trade
I add information frictions to a basic two-country trade partial-equilibrium model 
with storage (based on Williams and Wright 1991 and Coleman 2009) by changing 
the information set of market participants. The model mimics cotton trade in the 
nineteenth century by focusing on the role of intermediaries in trade and showing 
how information frictions affect export decisions.
Cotton is elastically supplied by producers in country NY as given by the lin-
ear aggregate inverse (net) supply function  p S (  q t ) =  a ̅S +  b S  q t . Intermediaries buy 
cotton in NY and ship it to another country LIV, where they sell it to consumers.20 
Shipping takes one period and costs  τ per unit shipped.21 Merchants are perfectly 
competitive and risk neutral. Aggregate consumer demand in LIV is stochastic and 
19 The full set of results for the variance of exports normalized by average exports (similar to the coefficient 
of variation) is provided in the online Appendix. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that the 
increased volatility of exports in the post-telegraph period could also be explained by a banking crisis in May 1866. 
In the online Appendix I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of a banking crisis dummy. 
20 If cotton was not exported, it could either be stored or bought by domestic cotton millers (mostly from New 
England). The supply function should therefore be interpreted to be net of domestic demand. 
21 The numerical predictions are robust to allowing for ad valorem instead of unit trade cost. 
Table 9—Effect of Telegraph on the Variance of Cotton Exports from New York to Liverpool
  ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)    ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)   ˆ  var(exp)/ ‾ exp   ˆ  var(exp)/ ‾ exp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.29 −0.39 −0.94 0.30 −1.03 0.10 −1.00 0.26 −1.59
(0.04) (0.22) (0.39) (0.04) (0.47) (0.07) (0.46) (0.13) (0.74)
Telegraph dummy 0.33 0.46 0.57 0.32 0.61 0.38 0.61 0.49 0.88
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) (0.21) (0.31)
Transport costs  τ t 1.77 1.19 1.26 1.11 1.89(0.58) (0.39) (0.44) (0.44) (0.71)
Cotton supply t−1 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.06(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Transport costs  τ t include:
 Freight cost Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Other transport costs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding no-trade periods Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 604 604 604 575 575 575 575 575 575
Notes:  ˆ  var( pdiff t ) ≔   N before  ________  N before − 1 ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff before ) 2 if the observation is before the telegraph, and  ˆ  var( x t ) ≔   N after  _______ 
 N after − 1 ( pdiff t −  ‾ pdiff after ) 2 if the observation is after the telegraph. This implies that the coefficient on the con-
stant yields the sample variance on the period before the telegraph, and the coefficient on the telegraph dummy 
yields the change in the sample variance before versus after the telegraph. Exports are in thousand bales. Controls 
are as in Table 8. Newey-West standard errors (lag = 2) in parentheses.
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given by a linear inverse demand function with stochastic, autocorrelated intercept, 
p t D ( q t ) =  a Dt −  b D  q t , where  a Dt follows a stationary autoregressive process of order 
1 around mean  a ̅D :  a Dt −  a ̅D =  ρ D (  a D, t−1 −  a ̅D ) +  ϵ t  with   ϵ t ∼ N (0,  σ 2 )  and 
0 < ρ < 1 .22 In LIV there are storers who can buy cotton, store it for one period, 
and sell it in the next period. Holding the good for more than one period is equivalent 
to storers selling their stored quantity and buying it immediately back to store it for 
another period, i.e., revaluing their stock every period. Storage costs are  θ per unit 
stored for one time period. Storers are perfectly competitive and risk neutral.
Maximization Problem of Merchants.—The representative merchant  i chooses 
exports  x it that maximize expected profits conditional on his information set  I t M :
  max   x it ≥0 E [ (  p t+1 LIV −  p t NY − τ)  x it |  I t M ] .
Exports are restricted to be nonnegative, because with time-consuming ship-
ping, negative exports are equivalent to imports from a future period, which is 
not possible. As merchants are price takers, this maximization problem is lin-
ear with first-order conditions (FOC)  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] −  p t NY − τ = 0 if  x it > 0 and 
 E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] −  p t NY − τ ≤ 0 if  x it = 0 . Aggregate exports are  x t =  ∑ i  x it . The 
no-arbitrage condition at the industry level is23
(1)  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] ≤  p t NY + τ  ⊥   x t ≥ 0 .
Merchants choose exports that equalize the difference between expected prices 
in LIV in the next period and current prices in NY, subject to transport cost, except 
if expected prices in LIV are too low and it is not optimal to export at all. In either 
case, expected profits of merchants are zero, but realized profits may be positive or 
negative at any point.
Maximization Problem of Storers.—The maximization problem of the representa-
tive storer  j is similar, but now arbitrage is across time instead of space. Each storer 
chooses stock  s jt to maximize expected profits, conditional on his information set  I t S :
  max   s jt ≥0 E [ (  p t+1 LIV −  p t LIV − θ)  s jt |  I t S ] .
Storers are also price takers, and first-order conditions are:  E [ p t+1 LIV |   I t S ] − 
 p t LIV − θ = 0 if  s jt > 0 and  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t S ] −  p t LIV − θ ≤ 0 if  s jt = 0 .24 Aggregate 
storage is  s t =  ∑ j  s jt . The no-arbitrage condition at the storage industry level is
(2)  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t S ] ≤  p t LIV + θ  ⊥   s t ≥ 0 .
22 The demand function is similar to Evans and Harrigan (2005), with an autocorrelated demand process. 
23 The sign  ⊥ denotes a mixed complementarity problem that is equivalent to two conditions: either 
 E [ p t+1 LIV |   I t M ] −  p t NY = τ and  x t > 0 ; or  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] −  p t NY ≤ τ and  x t = 0 . If  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] −  p t NY > τ merchants 
would like to export an infinite amount, which is not an equilibrium. If  E [ p t+1 LIV |  I t M ] −  p t NY = τ , individual mer-
chants are indifferent about how much to export, and in equilibrium aggregate exports are determined by mar-
ket-clearing conditions. 
24 Note that equivalently, the problem can also be formulated using value functions (as in Williams and Wright 
1991, p. 53), because consumer demand is assumed to be intertemporally separable. 
679STEINWENDER: INFORMATION FRICTIONSVOL. 108 NO. 3
Storers increase storage until expected prices in LIV in the next period are equal 
to today’s prices in LIV plus storage cost, unless expected prices are too low to make 
profits from storage. The expected profits of storers is zero, but like merchants, stor-
ers may realize profits or losses in any specific period.
Note that a particular feature of commodity storage models is that it is not pos-
sible for the market as a whole to store negative quantities. While each individual 
stock holder could in principle store a “negative amount” (that is, selling “short”) by 
borrowing the commodity from other storers, selling it on the spot market, buying 
the same amount of stock in the next period, and returning it to the lender, this is not 
true for the market as a whole (Williams and Wright 1991).
Information Frictions.—Decisions about storage and exports are based on 
expected prices in LIV conditional on the information set of the respective agents. I 
consider two different information regimes:
• Delayed Information (DI). Assume merchants are based in NY, where they 
make their exporting decision by buying from suppliers.25 They possess infor-
mation about all shocks in LIV up to period t − 1 and must forecast LIV prices 
in period t + 1, when their exports can be sold in LIV. Similarly, storers are 
based in LIV, where they make their storage decisions. They have information 
about demand shocks in LIV up to period t when forecasting LIV prices for 
period t + 1 and information about NY up to the previous period t − 1.
• Instantaneous Information (II). All market participants are informed about 
demand shocks in LIV up to period t when forecasting expected prices in period 
t + 1.
Below I refer to the DI regime as having “information frictions.” The introduction 
of the telegraph can be interpreted as a reduction in (or almost elimination of) infor-
mation frictions.
Equilibrium Conditions.—Equilibrium is determined by the FOC of merchants 
(1) and storers (2) and market-clearing conditions in both countries. In NY elastic 
supply meets the export demand of merchants:
(3)  p t NY =  a ̅S +  b S  x t .
In LIV supply is given by imports (equal to the amount of goods exported from 
NY in the previous period) plus storage from the previous period  s t−1 , while demand 
is by consumers and storers:
(4)  p t LIV =  a Dt −  b D ( x t−1 +  s t−1 −  s t ) .
25 In practice, merchants had representatives (usually family members) in both New York and Liverpool. If a 
merchant was in Liverpool, he would have had to travel to (or communicate with) New York to export cotton from 
Liverpool to New York, and therefore would have the same information as a merchant already based in New York. 
Therefore we can assume that merchants are based in New York only. 
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Analytical Expressions.—The FOC for merchants (1) together with market- 
clearing conditions (3) and (4) yield analytical expressions for exports and the price 
difference, which are useful for intuition and interpretation. Exports depend on 
expected demand shocks and expected change of stock in period t + 1, when the 
shipment arrives in LIV, conditional on the information of merchants:
(5)  x t =   max   
 
 
{ E [ a D, t+1 +  b D  s t+1 −  b D  s t |  I t M ] −  a ̅S − τ    __________________________   b S +  b D , 0} .
The price difference adjusted for shipping time is equal to the error made in fore-
casting demand shocks and changes in stock, if exports are positive, and the price 
difference is determined by local supply and demand conditions if exports are zero:
(6)  pdif f t+1 ≔  p t+1 LIV −  p t NY − τ
 =  {  a D, t+1 − E [ a D, t+1 |  I t 
M ] +  b D (Δ  s t+1 − E [ Δ  s t+1 |  I t M ] )  if  x t > 0      a D, t+1 +  b D ( s t+1 −  s t ) −  a S − τ if  x t = 0.
Storage is endogenous, as it depends on the information regime and cannot be 
solved for analytically (Deaton and Laroque 1996; Williams and Wright 1991).
Numerical Solution and Calibration.—I adjust numerical solution approaches 
developed by the commodity storage literature (e.g., Coleman 2009; Williams and 
Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1996) to allow for different types of information 
sets of agents that affect how expectations are formed. Details of the numerical solu-
tion and the calibration of parameters can be found in the online Appendix.
No Storage.—For intuition, consider first the case without storage. Consider a 
demand shock.26 Under delayed information, exporters in NY do not know about 
the demand shock upon impact, and therefore there is no immediate response in 
exports. Prices in LIV increase due to the unsatisfied demand, while prices in NY 
stay the same. The difference between the price in LIV during the next period and 
the current price in NY—the relevant price difference for arbitrage—increases as 
prices in LIV go up. In the next period exporters learn about the demand shocks and 
adjust exports upward, which increases prices in NY, but it takes another period for 
exports to arrive in LIV and prices to fall. Thus, it takes two periods after the shock 
for the price difference to return to zero.
Under instantaneous information, adjustment is faster: exports increase imme-
diately, driving up the price in NY. There is still a spike in the LIV price because of 
the shipping delay. The shipping time-adjusted price difference increases for one 
period as well, as exporters make unexpected profits, but adjusts in the next period 
as exporters arbitrage away these profits.
26 Figures of impulse-response functions that illustrate this narrative are provided in the online Appendix. 
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I simulate the model over 10,000 periods for both information regimes to com-
pute summary statistics. The second column in panel A of Table 10 shows that the 
predictions of the model without storage match the empirical results: the model pre-
dicts a fall in the average price difference and in the variance of the price difference, 
and an increase in average exports and the variance of exports.
For the intuition of these results, consider equation (5) (setting storage to zero). 
Exports are a function of expected demand shocks. The distribution of expected 
demand depends on the information regime. With more information, the variance 
of expected demand is higher. Consider two extremes. Without any information, 
expected demand is a constant with zero variance. With perfect foresight, expected 
demand is actual demand and has the variance of the demand shock. In between, 
more information leads to a higher variance in expected demand, and therefore 
exports. The following lemma shows this formally.
Table 10—Change from Delayed to Instantaneous Information Regime (Percent)
Model
            Storage cost: Data No storage 0.25 0.10 0.0229 0.01
Panel A. No supply shock
Price difference:  p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t 
 Mean −49.3 −49.5 −53.6 −88.1 −207.9 −223.9
 Variance −94.8 −33.7 −39.1 −43.6 −46.9 −46.6
Exports
 Mean 37.7 4.2 3.6 1.9 0.8 0.5
 Variance 199.4 26.0 24.0 19.3 12.3 7.7
 Share of periods with zero trade −3pp 3.8 3.6 1.6 0.02 <0.01
Storage
 Mean 53.2 N/A −7.4 −4.0 −1.5 −1.0
 Variance −49.2 N/A −6.2 −3.5 −1.3 −0.7
Panel B. Supply shock
Price difference:  p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t 
 Mean −49.3 −18.1 −15.8 −8.1 −1.3 −0.7
 Variance −94.8 −25.6 −28.0 −23.6 −6.5 −1.1
Exports
 Mean 37.7 3.3 3.0 1.4 0.3 0.4
 Variance 199.4 14.3 12.6 7.6 1.8 0.8
 Share of periods with zero trade −3pp 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.5
Storage
 Mean 53.2 N/A −2.2 −4.1 −5.8 −6.7
 Variance −49.2 N/A −1.7 −3.9 −3.0 −7.9
Panel C. Risk premium
Price difference:  p t+k LIV −  p t NY −  τ t 
 Mean −49.3 −477.1 −515.8 −319.2 −200.5 −181.5
 Variance −94.8 −34.8 −39.6 −41.4 −42.7 −43.5
Exports
 Mean 37.7 36.3 36.0 36.0 39.4 41.8
 Variance 199.4 42.2 41.2 34.3 28.4 28.2
 Share of periods with zero trade −3pp −7.7 −8.0 −9.6 −10.8 −11.1
Storage
 Mean 53.2 N/A −3.7 −4.4 −5.3 −6.3
 Variance −49.2 N/A −5.9 −5.9 −3.7 −8.6
Notes: Change is from delayed (= before telegraph) to instantaneous (= after telegraph) information regime, in 
percent of the variable in the delayed information regime. Summary statistics are based on data aggregated over 10 
days. Price difference is net of total transport cost. Storage cost of 0.0229 are given by historical accounting state-
ments of merchants, while storage cost of 0.25 are consistent with the average stock-to-export ratio in the data. 
The true storage cost was probably within this range of values. Model predictions are based on a simulation of the 
model over 10,000 periods.
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LEMMA 1: When switching from delayed to instantaneous information, the vari-
ance of expected demand increases,
  var [E [ a D, t+1 |  I t−1 M ] ] < var [E [ a D, t+1 |  I t M ] ] .
PROOF: 
See online Appendix.
The magnitude of the change depends on the autocorrelation coefficient in a non-
linear way and is largest with an autocorrelation coefficient of around 0.7. More 
persistence means information is less important because even the lagged demand 
shock is a good predictor of the future, and less persistence means that even current 
shocks are not very informative about future shocks. However, as persistence falls, 
the variance of expected demand also falls, and the percentage change in the vari-
ance increases monotonically.27
Since exports cannot be negative, this gives rise to a censoring of the distribution 
of expected demand, which increases average exports (both unconditional and con-
ditional on exports being positive), as the following Lemma shows.
LEMMA 2: Suppose  
 a ̅D −  a ̅S − τ______  b S +  b D  > 0 , which means that there are positive exports 
at the average demand shock. Then, when switching from delayed to instantaneous 
information:
 (i) Average exports increase,
  E [ x t DI ] < E [ x t II ] .
 (ii) Conditional on exporting, exports increase,
  E [ x t DI |  x t DI > 0] < E [ x t II |  x t II > 0] .
PROOF:
See online Appendix.
Censoring increases average exports, because in periods of very high demand, 
merchants know about it in the instantaneous information regime and export more. 
However, in periods of very low demand, exports are zero in both information 
regimes, and it does not matter whether merchants know exactly how low demand is. 
Censoring introduces an asymmetric effect on exports. The magnitude of this effect 
depends on how much the probability of zero exports increases, which is a nonlinear 
function of the autocorrelation coefficient and the variance of the demand innovations.
Merchants equalize expected prices across countries, and the resulting realized 
price difference equals the forecast error of merchants, as equation (6) shows. If 
merchants were not making any forecast error, which would happen if they could 
27 Except for the special case of a white noise shock process, for which the variance of expected demand is 
always zero and does not change because information is irrelevant. 
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foresee demand shocks, the lagged spatial price difference  pdif f t+1 would be zero, 
and the no-arbitrage condition would hold ex post. With information frictions or 
shipping time, the no-arbitrage condition holds only in conditional expectations, 
and merchants make a forecast error depending on the information they have. The 
volatility of forecast errors falls when more information becomes available (a result 
well established in the finance literature), which explains why the volatility of the 
price difference falls when switching from the DI to the II regime.
LEMMA 3: When switching from delayed to instantaneous information, the vari-
ance of the forecast error falls,
  var [ a D, t+1 − E [ a D, t+1 |  I t−1 M ] ] > var [ a D, t+1 − E [ a D, t+1 |  I t M ] ] .
PROOF:
See online Appendix.28
The magnitude of this change grows with persistence.
The average price difference falls after switching to the II regime. This holds for 
the same reason that average exports increase. Under the DI regime, positive demand 
shocks are systematically underestimated, leading to high prices in LIV and a large 
price difference as exports are restricted. These positive price differences are elim-
inated under the II regime, as exports are sufficiently high. Note that this does not 
mean that merchants were making profits under the DI regime, as high ex post profits 
in cases when demand was higher than expected were offset by equivalently high 
losses in cases when demand was smaller than expected. Neither does this mean that 
merchants make losses under the II regime, as they avoid negative price differences 
by not exporting at all (when they would have exported under the DI regime).
Storage.—Storage reduces the effect of information frictions. When merchants 
overestimate demand and ship too much, part of the imports can be stored for the 
future and consumed when merchants underestimate demand and ship too little. 
Storage smooths demand shocks (Williams and Wright 1991, p. 43) and results in 
prices fluctuating less than in a model without storage (and showing a higher auto-
correlation than the underlying shocks; Deaton and Laroque 1996).
When a demand shock hits, LIV prices in the same period go up, because the 
increased demand is not absorbed by increased imports (this occurs only in the next 
period due to the shipping delay), and it is only partially absorbed by an increased 
release from storage.29 Why is it not optimal for storers to release enough stock to fully 
absorb the demand shock and therefore smooth prices perfectly? I present an indirect 
proof. Assume that storage is run down enough to satisfy the additional demand and 
that there is no price increase in LIV. Consider first the case in which exports increase 
to replenish the stock during the next period. Increased exports lead to increased 
NY prices, because the supply curve is upward sloping. Merchants export cotton at 
increased NY prices only if there is an equivalent increase in expected prices in LIV 
28 This result also holds if the demand shock is a random walk. 
29 Figures of impulse-response functions that illustrate the narrative are provided in the online Appendix. 
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during the next period. However, if expected prices in LIV during the next period rise, 
storers want to keep some stock to sell in the next period, and therefore they do not 
release it in the current period, which contradicts our assumption. Consider now the 
case in which exports do not increase to replenish the stock next period. Due to the 
stock release in the current period, stock will be lower than usual in the next period. 
If there is another high demand shock in the next period (which is highly probable 
with autocorrelated demand shocks but is possible even if demand shocks are i.i.d.), 
stock will be run down further. If imports never increase, at some point there will be 
 stock-outs, which result in very high prices (only infinite stock can insure against 
stock-outs). Storers foresee this and therefore will not release all their stock in the cur-
rent period, which is again a contradiction to our assumption. Overall, in equilibrium, 
stock will be released to partially but not fully offset demand shocks (lower storage cost 
will lead to larger stock releases), and exports will increase slightly over an extended 
period to slowly replenish stock to equilibrium levels. The larger the autocorrelation 
of the shock process, the less successful storage will be in smoothing prices.
If the storage technology were “perfect,” prices would be completely stabilized 
and information would not matter. However, perfect storage requires an infinite 
amount of stock to insure against the small but positive probability that long periods 
of particularly high demand will run down inventories (Townsend 1977; Deaton and 
Laroque 1996; Williams and Wright 1991). As Williams and Wright (1991, p. 159) 
state, with aggregate demand shocks, “Storage is asymmetric—able to support a 
glut but not alleviate every shortage.”
Because storage does not fully smooth prices, there is still a spike in the price dif-
ference adjusted for shipping time. The increased exports arrive in the next period, 
but the LIV price does not fall very much, as demand is still high. Stock no longer 
has to be run down as much to stabilize the price in LIV. The possibility of storage 
means that demand shocks are smoothed over time: exports do not have to increase 
immediately, thereby increasing the supplier price in NY, but instead can increase 
less but over a longer period, while stock is slowly built up again.
With delayed information, equilibrium stock is higher. When a demand shock 
hits, stock is released just as in the II regime. Since the exports increase only in the 
subsequent period, more stock needs to be released in order to smooth prices. The 
price difference adjusted by shipping time takes two periods to adjust.
Table 10 shows the changes in summary statistics of the numerical simulations 
for a variety of storage cost levels. The predictions of the model with storage are 
still in line with the data: average exports and the variance of exports increase, while 
the average price difference and the variance of the price difference fall. The smaller 
the storage cost, the smaller the absolute change in all of the moments. However, 
because the average and variance of the price difference become smaller, the per-
centage change due to reduced information frictions becomes larger. For storage 
cost of 0.0229 (which merchants report in historical accounting statements), the 
model can predict the drop in the average price difference quite well, and about 
 one-half of the drop in the variance of the price difference.30 The model is less 
30 Since the storage cost in the data is not as reliable as other numbers, I use an alternative calibration using the 
ratio of stock to exports, which corresponds to storage cost of around 0.25. More details are provided in the online 
Appendix. 
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successful in explaining the quantitative change in exports. However, when inter-
preting quantitative changes, note the following caveat. Since the daily model does 
not aggregate up nicely to the one-period (equivalent to roughly 10 days) model 
because of overlapping shipments, this simplified model should probably be used 
for qualitative rather than quantitative analysis.
The model also predicts the proportion of periods without trade to increase, as 
with a larger variance of expected demand the probability of expected demand being 
below the no-export threshold increases. This effect is dampened by storage, but 
is nonetheless inconsistent with the data, in which the share of zero trade periods 
actually falls.
The model also has two predictions for storage. First, information reduces the 
need for stock to smooth shocks, so after the telegraph, average stock should fall. 
Second, before the telegraph storage was adjusted in response to demand shocks 
because exports could not react immediately, while after the telegraph exports could 
react, reducing the need for storage to be adjusted, which results in a fall in the 
variance of stock. Only the second prediction is true in my data (whereas the first 
prediction becomes true in the long run, in the years after my data ends).
I will now provide two extensions of the basic model and discuss how well they 
match the data.
Supply Shocks.—For a more realistic model, I allow for stochastic supply shocks. 
Exports are then a function also of supply shocks, and storage in LIV depends on 
information about supply shocks: the current supply shock in the II regime, and the 
lagged supply shock in the DI regime.
Supply shocks affect the model in two ways. First, they increase baseline variabil-
ity. Second, there is an additional impact of the telegraph: more information is not 
only relevant for merchants in NY, who learn about demand shocks in LIV sooner, 
but also for storers in LIV, who learn about supply shocks in NY sooner.31 After the 
telegraph, storers in LIV can run down inventory, foreseeing increased imports next 
period due to a supply shock in NY, whereas before the telegraph, they could not 
respond. Panel B in Table 10 shows that this additional effect does not alter the qual-
itative prediction of the model, while the predicted effects are quantitatively smaller.
Risk Aversion.—The changes in average exports in the data are larger than the 
model predicts. One reason could be that in reality merchants were risk averse rather 
than risk neutral. The higher uncertainty in the delayed information regime leads 
risk-averse merchants to export less, exaggerating the effect of the telegraph.32 
This notion is also consistent with the reports of contemporary observers, which 
praise the telegraph for extensively reducing the risk for merchants. For example, 
Hammond (1897, p. 284–285) writes that the telegraph “diminished risk in buying 
cotton from America,” as “the blind speculation of the importing merchant […] was 
replaced by a probability bordering on certainty.” Panel C in Table 10 illustrates that 
31 See the online Appendix for empirical evidence on this. 
32 Allowing for imperfect competition among merchants would also yield these predictions. However, the 
Herfindahl indices in the online Appendix suggest that this explanation is unlikely. 
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it is possible to magnify the quantitative impact of the telegraph significantly by 
adding a constant risk premium to the DI regime.33
Reduced risk promotes trade, and this overturns the prediction of the baseline 
model with respect to periods with zero trade. In line with the data, the share of 
periods with no trade now falls by several percentage points.
All models consistently predict that average stock should fall after the telegraph, 
which is not the case in the data. One explanation to reconcile these findings could 
be that storers were not immediately fully aware of the potential of the telegraph to 
reduce the amount of stock necessary. This is certainly possible, as they were not 
aware of other potential uses of the telegraph either: e.g., the earliest accounts of 
transatlantic futures trades are from 1868 (Farnie 2004). In fact, aggregate annual 
stock data show that Liverpool stock amounted to about 15 percent in the 5 years 
before the telegraph (excluding the Civil War years), and fell to around 7 percent 
in the 5 years after the telegraph (see table in the online Appendix). A reduction in 
stock is therefore a more long-term benefit of the telegraph, resulting in welfare 
gains, as storage costs are reduced. However, as we do not see this in the data in 
the short term, the calculations of the efficiency gain from the telegraph in the next 
section do not include efficiency gains from reduced storage costs, and are therefore 
a lower bound on the long-run efficiency gains from the telegraph.
V. Efficiency Gains from the Telegraph
This section shows that a lower bound of the deadweight loss (DWL) from infor-
mation frictions is a function of only three parameters: the squared observed price 
difference across markets, the slopes of the supply, and demand functions. This is 
an analytical result obtained from a more general version of the model presented 
above: it does not rely on the numerical solutions obtained in the previous section, 
nor on assuming a specific time series process for the demand and supply shocks, as 
observables are sufficient statistics for the underlying realized shocks. Furthermore, 
I use daily data for the estimation rather than ten-day periods as in the numerical 
model.
Regarding welfare in a dynamic storage model, I follow Williams and Wright 
(1991, p. 350), who measure the welfare generated in any period  W t as the sum 
of current consumer surplus  C S t , current producer surplus  P S t , current profits and 
losses of merchants  M S t and storers  S S t , and the expected present value of the net 
social surplus from current stock  ESS ( s t ) .34 The latter captures increases in future 
consumer surplus upon consumption of the current stock as well as future reduc-
tions of producer surplus when releases of stock depress prices.
Current consumer surplus  C S t is given by the area underneath the consumer 
demand function minus the price paid. The expected net present value of the social 
surplus from the quantity stored  ESS ( s t ) is given by the additional area under the 
market demand curve and the consumer demand curve, minus the price paid. 
Current producer surplus  P S t is given by the area above the supply curve up to the 
33 More information is provided in the online Appendix. 
34 In the online Appendix, I use an alternative approach that replaces the expected surpluses from stock with 
actual surpluses, using the cruder weekly stock data. Results are similar. 
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price received by producers when selling to merchants in NY. Current surpluses 
of merchants and storers,  M S t and  S S t , are given by their profits or losses. Current 
welfare is therefore35
(7)  W t =   ∫ 0  x t−1 + s t−1   p M (q ) dq −  ∫ 0  x t−1   p S (q ) dq −  p t−1 LIV  s t−1 .
This expression measures the welfare associated with a specific export quantity 
x t−1 , independent of how this export quantity is determined. Now consider the fol-
lowing counterfactual as a benchmark case: what would welfare have been, had 
merchants foreseen demand shocks and changes in stock? The exports in this bench-
mark case  x t−1 ∗ would have been the efficient export quantity that maximizes welfare; 
denote this efficient welfare as  W t ∗ . Any deviation from efficient exports results in 
reduced welfare (holding everything else constant). Define deadweight loss in a spe-
cific period as the difference in welfare to the benchmark:  DW L t =  W t ∗ −  W t . The 
theorem below gives a lower bound for deadweight loss from information frictions.
THEOREM 1: The deadweight loss from a specific export transaction  x t−1 > 0 
compared to exports in the benchmark case when merchants can foresee market 
demand, holding everything else constant, is bounded from below by  DWL ‾ ,
(8)  DWL ( x t−1 ) =  W t ∗ −  W t ≥   (  p t LIV −  p t−1 NY ) 
2   ___________
2(  b D +  b S ) ≕  DWL ‾ ,
where prices  p t LIV and  p t−1 NY denote equilibrium prices associated with exports  x t−1 . 
PROOF:
See online Appendix.
This formula shows that the observed spatial price difference  p t LIV −  p t−1 NY , the 
slope of the demand curve  b D , and the slope of the supply curve  b S are sufficient 
statistics for the lower bound of the deadweight loss from information frictions.36
Note that the underlying assumption of the welfare calculation is that con-
sumption is intertemporally separable in a very specific sense: consumers cannot 
 intertemporally smooth consumption except by engaging in storage activities (the 
identity of storers in the model is undefined). Furthermore, as the demand function 
does not depend on income, there are also no income effects (with zero income elas-
ticity, the Marshallian surplus is identical to the Hicksian compensating and equiva-
lent variations each period). With these assumptions I follow the commodity storage 
literature (e.g., Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1996; Coleman 
2009) and focus on simply adding information frictions to existing models.
Considering the expression for the deadweight loss (equation (8)), it is not sur-
prising that the deadweight loss from information frictions is a function of the 
35 A more detailed derivation is provided in the online Appendix. 
36 In the online Appendix, I provide figures representing how the efficiency loss due to information frictions can 
be illustrated using Harberger Triangles. 
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observed price difference. The LOP states that any spatial price difference gets 
arbitraged away if agents are fully informed (i.e., if merchants can foresee market 
conditions upon arrival of shipments). The literature on the LOP therefore interprets 
observed price difference as a measure of the underlying market frictions and its 
associated deadweight loss. The theorem makes the relationship between deviations 
from the LOP and efficiency explicit. Since both positive and negative deviations 
from the LOP cause efficiency losses, the second moment of the price difference 
has first-order implications on the deadweight loss (the price difference enters in a 
squared form).
I estimate the daily deadweight loss from information frictions by extending the 
formula above to a daily setting, while allowing for transport cost,  
 ( p t LIV −  p t−k NY −  τ t−k ) 2   ____________ 
2(  b D +  b S ) , 
where k denotes the actual shipping time in days, and the demand and supply elas-
ticities are estimated based on daily data.
The observed price difference  p t LIV −  p t−k NY −  τ t−k falls dramatically after the tele-
graph. The fall in the price distortion after the telegraph is equivalent on average 
to a roughly 7 percent ad valorem tariff.37 The largest price distortions during the 
pre-telegraph period are equivalent to an ad valorem tariff of up to 55 percent. For 
comparison, note that the average US tariff abolished during NAFTA in 1994 was 
3 percent, while the highest abolished tariff was 12 percent, for textile trading with 
Mexico (Caliendo and Parro 2015).
To translate these price distortions into efficiency gains, I need estimates of the 
slopes of the supply and demand functions. Such estimates are often difficult to 
make, as quantities and prices are determined contemporaneously and finding a 
valid instrument is difficult. I propose a new identification strategy: since shipping 
takes time, exports are predetermined once they arrive in Liverpool, breaking the 
simultaneity problem for the case of i.i.d. shocks. For the case of autocorrelated 
shocks and positive storage, I use the model to control appropriately for the endog-
enous portion of the shocks, yielding identified regression equations.
Estimation of the Demand Curve.—The demand curve in Liverpool on a specific 
day  t + k , where k indicates the time (in days) a shipment takes to get from New 
York to Liverpool, is determined by the realization of the demand shock on that day, 
a D, t+k , the imports arriving in Liverpool on that day (which are equivalent to exports 
from New York k days earlier,  x t ), and net take-up or release of stock from storage 
on that day,  Δ  s t+k :
  p t+k LIV =  a D, t+k −  b D ( x t − Δ  s t+k ) .
Daily prices in Liverpool as well as daily imports can be observed. The main 
identification problem is the unobserved demand shock that is positively correlated 
with change in stock and exports. Note that exports are a function of lagged demand 
37 The equivalent ad valorem tariff of the distortion is calculated for each day as the absolute price difference 
minus transport cost in percent of the lagged New York price  p t−k NY . The average tariff equivalent is equal to the dif-
ference in the average of this measure between the pre- and post-telegraph periods. Days with no trade are excluded 
from this calculation. 
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shocks, which are correlated with demand shocks at t + k only via the autocorrela-
tion of the demand shock. My identification strategy will exploit this fact by model-
ing this dependence explicitly.
Assuming demand follows an AR(1) process around mean  a ̅D , we can express the 
demand shock in period  t + k in terms of the demand shock in period  t − l , where 
l denotes the information delay between Liverpool and New York, and the sum of 
demand innovations between  t − l and  t + k :
  a D, t+k = (1 −  ρ k+l )  a ̅D +  ρ k+l  a D, t−l +  ∑ 
i=0
k+l−1
  ρ i  ϵ D, t+k−i .
We can use the lagged demand function to control for the lagged demand shock, 
as  p t−l LIV =  a D, t−l −  b D ( x t−k−l − Δ  s t−l LIV ) . This results in an equation where all of the 
regressors except change in stock  Δ  s t+k LIV are uncorrelated with unobserved demand 
shocks. Current imports  x t can be used as an instrument for  x t − Δ  s t+k LIV, however. 
Data on stock in Liverpool are available only at weekly intervals, so I distribute 
the weekly change equally across the days of the week, introducing a measurement 
error that is also addressed by the instrumental variables strategy. Table 11 shows 
the results of estimating the following equation:
(9)  p t+k LIV =  β 0 +  β 1 ( x t − Δ  s t+k LIV) +  β 2  p t−l LIV +  β 3 ( x t−k−l − Δ  s t−l LIV ) +  ∑ 
i=0
k+l−1
  ρ i  ϵ D, t+k−i .
Column 1 shows the OLS results and column 2 shows the IV results. The first 
stage is strong, as indicated by the F-statistics. The instrument addresses both the 
correlation of stock changes and demand shocks in the error as well as measurement 
error in the stock changes. The latter seems to dominate as the OLS estimate is 
biased toward zero. The sign of the lagged Liverpool price is positive and less than 
1, as expected. In columns 3 and 4 the IV specifications are estimated separately for 
the period before and after the telegraph.38
The second-to-last row in Table 11 computes the demand elasticity at mean values 
of prices and quantities. The resulting demand elasticities seem rather high when com-
pared to estimates of demand elasticity of cotton in the nineteenth century in the litera-
ture (Irwin 2003), which range between 1.7 and 2.3. Note, however, that the estimates 
in the literature are based on yearly instead of daily data. Daily demand elasticities are 
much higher because they take into account the willingness of consumers (or cotton 
millers) to substitute consumption across time, which is easier across short periods 
compared to long periods. To empirically validate this argument, I run the demand 
estimation on different aggregation periods of my data. Aggregating the data strongly 
reduces the demand elasticity. For example, for three-monthly data, the demand elas-
ticity is as low as  − 2 (see the online Appendix for details on aggregation patterns).39
38 Note that equation (9) implies a specific relationship between the coefficients that can be tested, 
i.e.,  β 1 +   β 3  __ β 2 = 0 . The table reports χ2-test statistics on this null hypothesis, which was not rejected except when 
restricting the analysis to the subsample after the telegraph. 
39 As an anonymous referee pointed out, due to the imperfect substitutability of cotton from different locations, 
the demand estimated here should be interpreted as residual demand after accounting for supply of other cotton. 
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Estimation of the Supply Curve.—The slope of the supply function is estimated in 
a similar way. To better match the data, the supply function given by equation (3) is 
extended by allowing both for supply shocks and for storage in New York:
  p t NY =  b S (Δ  s t NY +  x t ) +  a St .
Again, the problems in estimating this equation are twofold. First, NY stock data 
are available only at weekly intervals, so I distribute the weekly change equally 
across days, introducing measurement error. Second, exports and stock changes 
are correlated with current supply shocks. I add a dummy for the harvest year and 
include a quadratic in the day of the harvest year to model supply fluctuations, but 
as this cannot fully address endogeneity concerns, I pursue an instrumental-vari-
ables approach for the estimation. In column 2 of Table 12, I use known prices from 
Liverpool,  p t−l LIV , as an instrument for the sum of export and stock changes,  Δ  s t NY + 
x t . The first stage is strong, as information about the latest prices from Liverpool 
influences exports and stock changes positively. If supply shocks are correlated, 
however, lagged Liverpool prices might reflect lagged supply shocks, and not be 
exogenous. Therefore, I use implied demand shocks  a D, t−l =  p t−l LIV +  b D ( x t−k−l − Δ 
s t−l LIV ) with the estimated slope of the demand function from the previous section 
as an instrument for exports and stock changes in column 3. In column 4 lagged 
Liverpool prices are again used as an instrument, but here  x t−k−l − Δ  s t−l LIV is added 
as a control, leaving only demand variations in the instrument.
The estimates yield a similar estimate of around 1.8 in all specifications after 
eliminating measurement error in the OLS estimation. Again, the equivalent supply 
elasticities are larger than the estimates based on yearly data mentioned in the liter-
ature, which are between 1 and 2 (see Irwin 2003 for a review), as is expected when 
Table 11—Estimation of the Slope of the Demand Function
Dependent variable:  p t+k LIV OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 x t − Δ  s t+k LIV −0.028 −0.050 −0.073 −0.031(0.015) (0.020) (0.033) (0.019)
 p t− l t  LIV 0.899 0.893 0.831 0.933(0.038) (0.037) (0.062) (0.034)
 x t−k− l t  − Δ  s t− l t  LIV 0.019 0.021 0.040 −0.006(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.007)
Observations 506 506 258 248
R2 0.852 0.852 0.698 0.879
First stage F-stat 284.0 136.2 243.2
First stage coefficient 0.707 0.775 0.634
(0.042) (0.066) (0.041)
χ2-test statistics:  β 1 =   β 3  __ β 2 0.081 0.727 0.289 4.465
p-value 0.776 0.394 0.591 0.035
Demand elasticity −174.3 −98.6 −106.4 −102.1
Sample Full sample Full sample Before telegraph After telegraph
Notes: Prices are denoted in pence/pound. The quantities in the regressor are given in 1,000 bales (1 bale  ≈ 400 
pounds). Index k denotes shipping time from New York to Liverpool, and  l t denotes information delay between 
Liverpool and New York. The sample size is smaller than in the other regression tables, because stock information 
is sometimes missing, in particular at the end of each quarter (for more details, see the online Appendix). HAC 
standard errors in parentheses.
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considering the substitution of supply across short time periods. When repeating the 
analysis of the supply estimation across data with an increasing aggregation hori-
zon, the supply elasticity falls considerably and converges toward the estimates in 
the literature (see the online Appendix for details).
Estimation of Efficiency Gains.—Combining the estimates for the slope of the 
supply and demand functions with the observed price difference according to for-
mula (8) yields an estimated deadweight loss with respect to the perfect-foresight 
benchmark case for every day in the data. Table 13 reports the aggregate annual 
deadweight loss before and after the telegraph. The difference in deadweight 
loss can be attributed to the telegraph and corresponds to around 8 percent of the 
 aggregate annual cotton export value (or 3 percent of total US exports).40 I construct 
a  confidence interval for the deadweight loss using the delta method on the estimates 
of the slopes of the supply and demand functions. The confidence interval of the 
efficiency gains from the telegraph ranges from 4 percent to 13 percent.
Three-quarters of the efficiency gain comes from reducing the variance of the 
price difference (due to within-year reallocation; mostly across weeks rather than 
across days within a week), and one-quarter from reducing the average price differ-
ence (due to increased average trade). If I exclude the anecdotal episode with the 
especially large demand shock described earlier from the calculation, the efficiency 
gain is 7 percent.
What are the sources of these efficiency gains? Why did cotton millers not post-
pone consumption if prices were high, or use storage to become less dependent on 
price shocks? In other words, why was the demand of cotton millers not perfectly 
40 Assuming that other US cotton ports experienced a similar efficiency gain as New York, and that there were 
no efficiency gains in exporting any other products. 
Table 12—Estimation of the Slope of the Supply Function
Dependent variable:  p t NY OLS IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Δ  s t NY +  x t 0.071 1.862 1.829 1.832 1.585 2.481(0.026) (0.338) (0.308) (0.312) (0.305) (1.008)
 x t−k− l t  − Δ  s t− l t  LIV −0.037 −0.082 0.096(0.043) (0.049) (0.071)
Observations 554 554 500 500 233 267
Harvest year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Harvest cycle Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Known 
Liv. price
Known 
demand shock
Known 
Liv. price
Known 
Liv. price
Known 
Liv. price
First stage F-stat 46.95 53.95 53.04 45.97 6.21
First stage coefficient 0.269 0.283 0.283 0.325 0.356
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.143)
Supply elasticity 410.0 15.7 16.0 15.9 24.7 7.5
Sample Full 
sample
Full 
sample
Full sample Full 
sample
Before 
telegraph
After 
telegraph
Notes: Prices are denoted in pence/pound. The quantities in the regressor are given in 1,000 bales (1 bale  ≈ 
400 pounds). Harvest cycle controls for day of the harvest season, and the square of it. HAC standard errors in 
parentheses.
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elastic? First, cotton spinners did not hold much raw cotton stock (Milne 2000; 
Farnie 1979). As I explain in the online Appendix, about 80 percent of the cotton 
stock was stored in warehouses near the port by storers, and only 20 percent was 
held by spinners in widely scattered stocks. This has a number of reasons: cotton 
is bulky and therefore needs large storage space, which was costly. Storing large 
quantities of cotton ties up capital, and is therefore costly as well. Liverpool and 
Lancashire were so well integrated (rapid transportation by railway and fast com-
munication via telegraph), and the Liverpool market was considered so efficient, 
that it was cheaper for spinners to get their supplies directly from the exchange and 
have it shipped to their mills when needed, despite the price fluctuations (Farnie 
1979). (In contrast, spinners on the continent, which were further away from cot-
ton exchanges, had to carry large reserve stocks in extensive warehouses, requiring 
more capital and therefore capital cost.) Finally, because cotton is one of the most 
inflammable raw materials, and fire risk at mills was large, with fireproof mills built 
only in the 1870s or 1880s, it was better not to store too much cotton at the mill 
(Shaw 1882; Farnie and Gurr 1998).
Second, the capital cost of constructing a cotton mill (including the machinery) 
was very high, so the economics included a larger fixed-cost component compared 
to labor and raw material cost (Farnie 1979; Fogg 1892). Cotton millers wanted to 
keep the mills running as many hours a week as possible, “[keeping the] machinery 
steadily and continuously working on orders” (Shaw 1882, p. 27). Cotton millers 
were very worried about stopping the production process: “any accident or needless 
stoppage means certain loss.” (Fogg 1892, p. 19) This is also reflected in the long 
working hours of mill workers (72 hours plus overtime) with very few breaks, which 
was only gradually and reluctantly eased until the end of the nineteenth century.41 
Mill managers even tried to reduce the time for replacing empty spindles with full 
ones as much as possible, to maximize output. Only when demand or supply was 
really low did the mills engage in working “short time,” i.e., reduce the weekly 
hours of their workers. Farnie (1979) describes that this happened only a few times 
during the nineteenth century, and not during the years studied in this paper.
Third, cotton millers faced a very volatile demand for their output of yarn and 
cloth. They had agents who watched the markets for yarn and cloth daily and advised 
“the manufacturer of all new demands and all changes in the requirements of the 
market, that the manufacturer may adapt his production to the varying wants of 
41 See http://www.spinningtheweb.org.uk/people/working.php, Fogg (1892), and Kenworthy (1842). 
Table 13—Estimation of Efficiency Gain from Telegraph
Annual deadweight loss, pounds 95% confidence interval
Before telegraph 837,703 [394,854; 1,277,383]
After telegraph 109,314 [51,135; 167,477]
Change −728,389 [−343,719; −1,109,906]
Change in percent −87
In percent of export value −8.4 [−4.0; −12.8]
Note: Confidence interval of deadweight loss calculated using the delta method on estimated 
slopes of the demand and supply functions.
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the world” (Shaw 1882, p. 27). This is because the market for their output was not 
just the domestic market, but the world market, and unpredictable developments 
in different countries with varying preferences led to rapid fluctuations because of 
war, peace, and ceasefire negotiations. In the online Appendix, I show the demand 
fluctuations for yarn, the output of cotton millers, using a weekly assessment of 
demand conditions from the Manchester Times. While this measure is not perfect, it 
indicates rapid changes in demand for the millers’ output.
The numerical model gives an alternative to assess the efficiency gains from the 
telegraph, as it allows the estimation of counterfactual scenarios. For example, we 
can ask how much storage cost would have had to be reduced to achieve the same 
efficiency gains as those brought by the telegraph. The numerical simulations sug-
gest that the change in information frictions led to an efficiency gain equivalent to a 
reduction in storage cost of around 20 percent.
VI. Conclusions
This paper exploits a clean historical experiment to assess the impact of informa-
tion frictions on the law of one price and trade: the establishment of the transatlantic 
telegraph cable connecting the United States and Great Britain in 1866. This episode 
provides a unique setting for studying information frictions. On one hand, it pro-
vides a dramatic and exogenous reduction in information frictions, as information 
transmission times fell unexpectedly from around ten days to only one day. On the 
other hand, I was able to draw upon a rich dataset based on historical newspapers, 
including high-frequency data not only on prices, but also on trade and information 
flows.
This setting allows me to contribute to the literature in several ways. First of all, 
it is possible to identify and measure the impact of information, which is usually 
endogenous, complex, and unobserved. This paper shows that a fall in information 
frictions causes better adherence to the law of one price. The average price differ-
ence between New York and Liverpool falls by 35 percent, and its variance falls even 
more dramatically, by 93 percent. This reduction in price distortions is equivalent to 
abolishing a roughly 7 percent ad valorem trade tariff.
Second, this paper shows that information frictions have real effects and are not 
just a reallocation of profits across market participants, because exports respond 
to information. After the telegraph, average trade flows increase and become more 
volatile. The model explains that this is the case because exports follow expected 
demand, conditional on information. More information makes expected demand 
more volatile, which explains why we observe more volatile exports after the tele-
graph. However, this effect is asymmetric, as there is a threshold beyond which it is 
not profitable to export at all. More information increases average exports, because 
there are more incidents with high expected demand and therefore large exports.
The third contribution of the paper lies in estimating the efficiency gains from 
reducing information frictions. Better information helps merchants to forecast future 
demand, resulting in a more efficient alignment of supply and demand across coun-
tries. This is reflected in the better adherence to the law of one price. To translate 
the reduced price distortions into efficiency gains, one needs to estimate supply and 
demand elasticities, which is usually difficult due to simultaneously determined prices 
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and quantities. This paper uses a novel identification strategy that exploits the fact that 
exports are predetermined once they arrive in Liverpool (since shipping takes time) 
and controls adequately for the possibility of storage. Overall, the efficiency gains 
from the telegraph are estimated to be around 8 percent of annual export value.
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